Abstract. This paper addresses the methodology of ontology construction. It identifies five styles of approach to ontologizing (deriving from philosophy, cognitive science, linguistics, AI/computational linguistics, and domain reasoning) and argues that they do not provide the same results. It then provides a more detailed example of one of the approaches.
Introduction
After nearly a decade in which statistical techniques made "ontology" a bad word in various computational communities, there are encouraging signs that the pendulum is swinging back. But ontologies will be most readily accepted by their traditional critics only if at least two conditions are met: good methodologies for building and evaluating them are developed, and ontologies prove their utility in real applications. This paper addresses the question of the/a methodology for ontology building, a topic that has received relatively little attention.
Since ontologies have many aspects, Section 2 outlines the aspect of interest for this paper, namely ontology content. Section 3 describes five alternative content construction methodologies that have been adopted in the past. Section 4 provides a generic ontology construction procedure, and Section 5 puts the previous two sections together by illustrating the language-oriented methodology with a more detailed account of how ontology builders might proceed, and what they might produce. Finally, Section 6 expresses the hope that further work on developing this and other ontology construction methodologies can be of use.
taxonomies such as WordNet. While it would be nice to adopt such requirements, the reality is that most people build ontologies to support their knowledge representation needs in some practical application, and that they are more concerned about the computational effectiveness and correctness of their application than about the formal completeness, correctness, or consistency of the ontology per se. (Should the system work well even if the ontology is somehow formally deficient, the practical projects I know of would be quite satisfied.) Naturally, completeness, consistency, etc., are ways to ensure that the ontology will not lead to unwelcome surprises in system behavior. But unfortunately, the strictures introduced by these requirements are usually so onerous that they make adopting the requirements tantamount to placing a severe limitation on the eventual scope of the ontology and hence of the whole practical enterprise. That is, especially for NLP applications, many people build their ontologies as relatively simple term taxonomies with some inheritance inference, but do not enforce stricter logical requirements.
When constructing an ontology (or domain model; the terms are used here interchangeably) one can either build everything de novo or one can start with the ontologies of others and combine, prune, and massage them together as needed. In recent work, several ontology building projects have created interfaces to assist with the manual merging of ontologies. Typically, these tools extend ontology building interfaces such as those of Ontolingua [97], Intraspect ( [22] http://polarismd.pepperdine.edu/Overview.html) and the Stanford CML Editor [23] by incorporating one or more variants of name matching and other heuristics plus validation routines that check for consistency of edited results [26, 20, 38, 34] .
With regard to the creation or extension of new domain models, some work in manual knowledge acquisition is developing interfaces that assist the knowledge entry worker by continually verifying what is entered, actively eliciting information to complete partial specifications, etc., using strategies modeled after human tutoring procedures [24, 5] .
However, what is still lacking in ontology construction is a systematic and theoretically motivated methodology that guides the builder and facilitates consistency and accuracy, at all levels. The reason for this lack is evident: today, we still do not have an adequate theory on which to base such a methodology. It is not even clear how one would begin to approach the problem of designing theoretically motivated procedures from a suitably general point of view. Consequently, although many people build ontologies today-see for example the OntoSelect website at http://views.dfki.de/Ontologies/ for over 750 ontologies in various domains-not one of the builders would be able to provide a set of operationalizable tests that could be applied to every concept and relation to inform in which cases his or her choices were wrong.
How then would one approach such a methodology? Well, we can consider what ontology builders actually do-the core operation(s)-and study how they justify their actions. As discussed in [1, 45, 21] , three situations can arise when aligning terms from two ontologies: either the two terms are exactly equivalent, or one term is more general than the other, or the terms are incompatible 1 . As soon as inconsistencies are found, one has to make a choice 2 . It helps if one understands why the creators of the source ontologies did what they did. Based on lessons learned from practical experience in merging parts of several ontologies [20] and discussions with numerous individuals, the author has identified five types of motivation, which can be identified with five different research approaches: the philosophers [16, 15, 43] ; the cognitive scientists [35, 10, 27, 2] ; the linguists [31, 39] ; the Artificial Intelligence reasoners [30, 13] , which includes the computational linguists [3, 36] ; and the domain specialists (too numerous to list). Each of these types of individuals operates in a distinct way, resolving questions with arguments that appeal to different authorities and patterns of reasoning, and (not unexpectedly) lead to very different re-sults. (It is important to point out right away that none of these are correct, compared to the others; the notion of correctness is itself a point of methodological discussion. But within each mode of thought, it is of course possible to be correct or wrong, to be more or less elegant, and to develop a more or less satisfying solution.)
In generating each new (candidate) ontology item, the ontologizer performs an act of creation. Stated as simply as possible, the ontologizer has to decide whether to create a term, and if so, how to place it with regard to the other existing terms (which constitutes some portion of the act of defining the term, of course). Then follows additional specification and definition. This decision process plays out as follows for the five 'personality types' of ontologizer:
Type 1: Abstract feature recombi nation (the philosophers) . The procedure of concept creation by additive feature specification-systematically adding new differentiae-is the historical method of ontologization; interesting examples can be found all the way back to Aristotle. A modern version is provided in [43] , who defines several highly abstract features (Concrete-Abstract; Positive-Negative; etc.) and then more or less mechanically forms combinations of them as separate concepts, using these features as differentiae. Sowa illustrates this procedure by generating the topmost few dozen concepts and arranging them in their combinatory lattice structure, under which he proposes a more traditionally-derived concept taxonomy be arranged. With the DOLCE ontology (www.loa-cnr.it/DOLCE.html, [12] employ so-called identity criteria to determine whether two concepts are the same or not, and how they may differ; these differences help establish the appropriate differentiae. The rigor adopted in this work, especially the use of identity criteria as a driving methodology, is a model for others. In general, the ontologizers adopting this approach are of course the philosophers; once they believe they have found the essential set of semantic primitives, the rest follows by logic. The approach is elegant, but unfortunately doesn't work beyond the very most abstract levels, and is hence not very useful for practical domain ontologies. Defining a list of the most abstract notions underlying our conceptualizations is a complex enough task; but it is truly scary to consider creating a list of all the differentiae one would have to specify (and arrange in some order, so as to avoid the full combinatory complexity) in order to define such notions as Love, Democracy, and (even) Table. Type 2: Intuitive o ntological distinctions (the cognitive scientists) . The oldest and most natural reason for creating a new concept is simply the intuitive feeling that it is not the same as anything else already defined, which means that one has to split it off from its near-siblings and begin a new variation or subspecies. Unfortunately people are not consistent in doing so, and 'split off' new 'concepts' quite actively as the occasion demands, creating ad hoc subgroupings differentiated by whatever feature(s) are relevant to their purposes. This playful freedom is useful for communication and no doubt for thought in general; its results are sometimes recorded (by having words that name the concepts), and sometimes not. The result is a hodge-podge of wordsense families whose meanings partly overlap but differ on arbitrary dimensions, and for which no regular correspondences are found across languages in general (see for example [8] for a very nice paper on plesionyms 3 in various languages). Determining this kind of concept formation is the specialty of the cognitive scientist (especially the one interested in language), whose methodology (and proof) turns to devising clever experiments to measure how people make distinctions between close concepts. But the fluidity of the distinction process, being dependent on the person's interests, knowledge, task, and other circumstances, make this approach to ontology building fraught with inconsistency to the point of hopelessness.
Type 3: Cross-linguistic phenomena (the linguist s) . For some people, concepts can be motivated simply because words or expressions for them appear in many languages. When many cultures independently name a thought, is that not evidence for the existence of that thought as a separate concept? Whether one believes Vygotsky [47] , Sapir [42] and Whorf [49] , or Piaget [41] as to which of language and thought is primary (if either), the very close intertwining of them in the mind is generally accepted. As shown for example in EuroWordNet [46] or the plesionym study [8] , analysis of cross-language differences uncovers complex and fascinating interrelationships among meanings and meaning facets. Naturally, this approach fits the linguistic tradition, and for some NLP applications, especially cross-lingual ones, paying attention to many languages for ontology construction and lexicon development can be rewarding (see for example [7] , about which more below). But since there are many concepts for which no words exist, and since it is easy to demonstrate shadings of meaning from one concept to another that suggest continua of unimagined dimensionality, no-one will accept the argument that "because it's so in language(s), it has to be exactly so in thought" as a final arbiter. Nonetheless, words, as the richest component in our arsenal of tools to attack meaning, remain central. Therefore language-inspired ontology work usually produces word networks such as WordNet that are strongest in the (typically large) middle region, corresponding approximately to language lexicons; at both the abstract (upper) and domain-specific and particular (lower) region, they tend to lose expressive utility.
Type 4: Inference-based concept generalizations (the computational reasoners) . For computational systems, one creates in effect a data model. The ontology (and domain model) is so arranged that those items in the domain that should be treated similarly are grouped together and typed, so that they can in fact be recognized and treated similarly. Such groupings tend to emphasize domain-specific concepts and produce more abstract concepts (i.e., upper ontologies) only insofar as they are required for grouping. For this methodology the validation method is simple and direct: Do I need separate treatment of some thing(s) by the system? If I create an appropriate new type, does the system work as required? The domain terms thus tend to mirror the metadata and the system variables. They must be defined in enough detail to support a reasonably powerful set of operators or rules, but not be so differentiated as to require too many rules. This methodology is relatively clean, depending on the elegance of the computational solution to the problem. Unfortunately, however, the decision justifications offered by systems builders today are seldom interesting to philosophers, psychologists, and linguists. Given how many ways there are to achieve a computational result, system builders are seldom able to express their analysis of the problem and its solution in terms of necessary information transformation operations, i.e., in compelling general information-theoretic terms that would convince the other disciplines' specialists of the logical necessity of organizing one's knowledge one way or another. This fact lies at the heart of the inevitable communication breakdown and decoupling that occurs when systems builders and any of the other disciplines' researchers set out jointly to build an ontology for some application, a breakdown that requires significant effort to overcome.
Type 5: Inherited domain distinctions (the domain specialists). In many ontology building enterprises, the reason for creating and arranging concepts stems neither from abstract theoretical analysis nor experimentation, but from existing domain theory and practice. Biologists, neuroscientists, aircraft builders, pump manufacturers, legal scholars, and anyone else in knowledge-intensive enterprises find it perfectly natural to construct ontologies that reflect the way their fields view their worlds; this class of ontologies is thus one of the most common in practice; see for example the over 700 ontologies listed on the OntoSelect website (http://views.dfki.de/ontologies/), covering space, travel, music, wine, sports, science, etc. [4] . Often the exercise of actually building an ontology is prompted by the desire to work in a computational setting, and frequently the organizational discipline imposed by ontology software causes an experience of some enjoyment and even some reorganization of the builder's own understanding. Connecting a domain ontology to a generic computational system (such as a sentence generator or parser) sometimes requires realignment and/or reconceptualization of the domain terms into the categories interpretable by the computational engine; a typical solution is to embed such domain model(s) under an Upper Model that supports the computation, as illustrated for sentence generation in [3] .
Addendum: Type 6: Taxonomic clarity . There is another motivation for introducing concepts, one that almost all ontology builders employ. Sometimes it is simply useful for an ontology builder to insert some mid-level concepts in order to create organizational clarity, without explicitly formulating the criteria that justify their existence (esthetics and/or clarity of display are reasons not generally deemed sufficient to measure up to serious insights derived from psychological experiment, philosophical argument, computational necessity, or cross-linguistic comparison).
It is tempting to consider these approaches as complementary; one could for example ask the philosophers to build the uppermost, most abstract, regions, the cognitive scientists to provide some overall ontology framework that the computationalists and domain specialists can then flesh out and refine, etc. But there is no guarantee that the distinctions natural to ontology builders of one type will in fact correspond to or be useful for others' purposes. In practice, such admixture tends to require that all parties learn a little about every approach, and that one of them becomes the ultimate arbiter, usually on irrelevant grounds such as personality or loudness of argument.
Ontology Construction Procedure
Mismatches between ontologies are a source of never-ending discussion and wonder. But they are not surprising; when concept creation decisions can be justified on such different grounds as listed above, mismatches are to be expected and are not really very interesting on an individual basis. The ontologies simply differ in content and 'focus'. What is interesting is when one discipline delivers no insight and another must come to its aid. To prevent disaster, a methodology of ontology creation should recognize this fact and assign relative priorities to the various concept creation methods and justification criteria a priori, before any actual ontology building is done.
The above considerations apply for all ontology building efforts (although upper ontologies, given their abstraction from domain particulars, are a somewhat special case). To create a domain model, the methodology generally adopted (see for example [14] ), which can be called continual graduated refinement, is:
1. Determine the general characteristics of the ontology to be built. A list of such characteristics (and additional ones) is provided in [19] , and includes the domain of interest, the purpose of the ontology, the target level of granularity, the conceptual and theoretical antecedents, etc. Central to these decisions is selecting the principal criteria of ontologization (concept creation and justification methods) and specifying their order. In this step the task/enterprise is determinate: is this domain model to be used in a computational system? Or is it a conceptual product for domain analysis and description? Who are the intended users/readers of the ontology, and what is their purpose with it? What justification criteria will they find most understandable, and do these criteria match the purpose or task in mind?
2. Gather all additional knowledge resources, including starter ontologies, upper structures or microtheories (of, say, time and space), glossaries of domain terms, supporting descriptive and definitional material, algorithms and tools, existing theoretical descriptions, etc.
3. Delimit the major phenomena for consideration: identify the core concepts, types of features allowed, principal differentiae, etc. To lay out the general area, starting with an existing upper ontology, even one with just some dozen nodes, can be helpful.
4. List all readily apparent terms/concepts important for the task or enterprise. These terms may be derived from a (meta-)data model, from the algorithm of the system (to be) built, from experts' reports on the major components and processes in the domain, etc.
5. For each concept, explicitly record the principle(s) and factors that justify its creation. The definition may still be incomplete and informal, but should contain the principal differentiae and features of interest. Also identify interrelationships between the concept and related concepts (including subclass hierarchicalization, part-wholes, equivalence/synonymy, etc.), and specify/define them.
6. Inspect the nascent domain model for (ir)regularity, (im)balance, etc. Then for each major region (types of entity, types of action, types of state, etc.) repeat steps 3 to 5, refining existing concepts as needed. During this iterative refinement, record all problematic issues; they may require extensions to the upper ontology or even to the basic criteria of ontologization.
7. When done, characterize the ontology or domain model by recording its essential parameters, as spelled out in [19] .
Working out the details of this methodology takes time and effort. Not all aspects apply in all cases, and not to all domains or ontologization styles [44] . Careful study of how domain ontologizers actually instantiate this procedure will help flesh out a systematic methodology of ontologizing.
5
Example Language-Based Methodology: Annotator-Driven Concept Granularity using Wordsenses
The core ontologization decisions outlined in the preceding section can be viewed as a question of concept granularity: given some semantic notion circumscribed by one or more near-synonymous words, how many concepts should one define for them, how should one organize the concepts, and how should one validate these choices? This section outlines, as example, a language-based methodology that starts by creating and validating wordsenses and then uses them to suggest concepts. It contains two parts: experiences with wordsense annotation and converting wordsenses into concepts.
Experiences in Wordsense Annotation
The OntoBank project (Weischedel et al., in prep.) is an ongoing attempt by researchers at BBN (Weischedel, Ramshaw, et al.) , the University of Pennsylvania (Marcus, Palmer, et al.) and ISI (Hovy et al.) to construct a shallow semantic version of a collection of texts. Should continuation funding be achieved, the goal is to build by hand a set of one million sentences with their associated shallow semantic frames. In this project, shallow semantics includes disambiguated concept/wordsense symbols for each noun, verb, and adjective; basic verb frames with relations to constituents; resolved anaphoric links; canonicalized representations for straightforward dates, numerical expressions, proper named entities, and a few other phenomena. Central to OntoBank is the PropBank wordsense differentiation and annotation procedure [25] . The IAMTC project [7] , which ended early for lack of continuation funding after one year, had as goal to uncover the representational machinery required to support an interlingua notation from an analysis of differences across seven languages. Project members annotated some 150 translated texts, each one in both English and its source language (one of Hindi, Arabic, Korean, Japanese, French, and Spanish). Similar to OntoBank, annotation included selection of a disambiguated concept/wordsense for each noun, verb, and adjective; the determination of an appropriate verb frame (in this case, LCS theta role frames [6] ) and its connections to sentence constituents; and the design of a series of incrementally deepening representations en route toward the interlingua.
The author participated in both OntoBank and IAMTC, in more or less the same role, as ontology maintainer and developer. In both cases, ISI's Omega ontology at http://omega.isi.edu [40, 18] was used as repository of all semantic symbols. In both projects, all nouns, verbs, and adjectives were annotated by multiple people, who selected the appropriate concept(s) to express the words' meaning(s) in context. Both projects paid considerable attention to the annotation interface, annotator training, post-annotation reconciliation discussions, and annotator agreement measures.
Of primary interest for this paper is the ontological considerations that arise when such annotation efforts are conducted. It is relatively straightforward, though not always easy, to build ontologies of specific well-circumscribed domains for computational purposes. But the picture changes somewhat when the focus is annotation of wide-coverage newspaper text in the interest of creating shallow semantic representations. In particular, the ontology maintainer is confronted with a stream of seemingly unrelated decisions about concept granularity and ontology placement, more or less one for every verb, noun, and adjective encountered. The OntoBank methodology is illustrative. Following the PropBank annotation procedure [25] , the most frequent N words of a given type (say, verbs) are selected for annotation. For each verb, 100 sentences containing it are extracted from the corpus. Two or more annotators each see the same hundred sentences plus a list of candidate concept (sense) choices extracted from the ontology. Their task is to select just those concepts that express the meaning(s) of the verb in a given context. It is apparent that the nature of the concept alternatives and the quality of their definition are of central importance. Omega, which for a large part is derived from the lexical network WordNet, usually contains too many close alternatives, confusing the annotators (annotator selection agreement when given WordNet senses as options is only around 70% for nouns). For example, the verb "drive" has 22 senses in WordNet, including separate senses for driving a car as chauffeur and driving a car as one's work. In an employment domain, the difference between chauffeur, taxi driver, and other kind of employed driver may be important, but in general texts this distinction is often not made, or it is so implicit that many people don't make it, leading to different annotator choices.
In contrast, the MIKROKOSMOS ontology [33, 32] , another source of concepts for Omega, almost always offers too little granularity; it has only one symbol for all vehicles, including cars, buses, airplanes, etc. Ideally, one would like something in between: just enough concepts to express the semantic differences that most people easily agree on in the context of the text.
From Words to Concepts: Hierarchical Graduated Refinement
Palmer and colleagues use sense creation/compression to build PropBank; they have developed a welltested procedure. A slightly more elaborated and formalized procedure was developed at ISI to mirror appropriate wordsenses in the Omega ontology, which for this work was extended to accommodate separately wordsenses and concepts [18] . This sense creation procedure is interesting to perform, and perfectly illustrates the problem of the ontology builder, and the need for a strict methodology. For example, how many senses (concepts) should one define for the word "drive"? Different members of OntoBank produced quite different results, which differed from the decisions of PropBank's expert sense creator. The continual graduated refinement procedure outlined above is as follows: starting with the word and a number of example sentences representing all/most of its meanings, identify and split out the most semantically different sense (cluster) and create a branch point in the evolving tree; then for each branch, repeat the process downward. At each split write down the criteria, or at least a description of the difference; these give a hint at the thought process for later discussion and may eventually allow one to define more-formal differentiae. For example, consider the following sentences for "drive": Given more sentences, additional subsenses can be found, including driving a tool ("drive the hammer") under <propel>, driving non-cars ("drive a bulldozer") under <direct>, employment ("drive a taxi for work") or phrasal expressions ("drive a hard bargain") under <other>, etc.
Adopting the above hierarchical graduated refinement procedure 4 is useful for several reasons. It supports human analysis and agreement by systematically removing the most glaringly different cases. It helps suggest differentiae. It allows one to vary the granularity at will by simply ending the differentiation process sooner or later, and by grouping together as undifferentiated all senses lower than the chosen level. This capability is extremely useful when one separates word senses from ontology concepts. As argued in for example [37] and discussed in [17] , not all wordsenses in the sense hierarchy need (or should) be converted into ontological categories (concepts). The sense hierarchicalization for "drive" above, for example, requires at least three distinct concepts, namely "drive mad" (i.e., something like Cause-Mental-Instability), the nonphysical sense group (rooted in something like Cause-State-Changetoward-Desired-Value), and the physical group (rooted in Cause-Movement-in-Desired-Direction) respectively. Being so different, the first of these will be inserted into the ontology at a point quite remote from the other two. Further, sentence 1, "drive the demons out of her", may be treated at two levels: the surface-metaphorical (in which case "demons" metaphorically stands for "illness" and the driving is nonphysical), or the 'true' semantic (in which case the meaning is something like Heal-of-Mental-Disorder, and there is no driving, even metaphorically). In the latter case, sentence 1 would also be classified in a region of the ontology quite remote from the other concepts.
One can continue ontologizing the sense hierarchy to the extent one wishes to (or can) formalize the differentiae and one believes further distinction provides valuable additional explanatory or computational utility. Each step of ontologization requires placing the newly formed concept into the growing ontology where appropriate. This procedure makes apparent that there is no direct homomorphism of the sense hierarchy into the ontology, though as senses are 'closer' lower down in the hierarchy, one would expect their ontological equivalents also to be closer in the ontology.
It is a good reason to stop ontologizing the sense hierarchy when no obviously most-different sense or sense group can be identified, that is, when it is possible to split the remaining group in several equally good ways according to different criteria. At this point, one has most probably reached a level of semantic homogeneity at which several features combine in equal measure to form the concept's unique identity.
Cross-language studies are useful in helping to identify a division between 'sense space' and 'ontology space'. In the IAMTC project, when the languages in question (Hindi, Arabic, Korean, French, Spanish, and Japanese) provided different words (and hence usually also senses) after translation (by various professional-quality translators) into English, then the granularity of the concept in question had to be such as to represent the senses common across the various translations, while their individual, languageidiosyncratic, facets of difference remained in the sense hierarchy. One can thus think of 'ontology space' as the interlingual representation symbols (symbols capturing common, or common enough, meaning aspects); of 'sense space' as the multi-lingual representation symbols (symbols for senses that may or may not co-occur across languages, but that are mapped to meanings no more specific than they denote themselves), and of 'lexical space' as the monolingual representation symbols (namely, the words of each language). There is a complex many-to-many mapping across both gaps.
Conclusion
The two-stage methodology-creating wordsenses and annotating them to determine granularity, followed by conversion of (part of) the sense hierarchy into ontology concepts has several desirable properties. It is 'empirical', in the sense that the semantic distinctness of a set of wordsense (concept) candidates can be validated through annotator agreement. This gives an upper bound on the granularity of concepts, and interestingly blends linguistic and cognitive motivations in a computational setting. The hierarchical graduated refinement procedure is easily extensible to finer detail, and provides suggested differentiae for formalization. The overall methodology accommodates comparison across and incorporation of different languages by separating language-dependent wordsenses from language-independent concepts.
It is not claimed that the methodology described here is a proven, or even adequately explored, methodology for ontology creation. But given the increasingly pressing need for more attention to methodology in current-day ontology creation, it is to be hoped that these thoughts will inspire further exploration. In addition, hopefully the new interest in ontologies will usher in more work on methodology as well. It is a fascinating and rewarding direction of research.
